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We exploit a variation in organizational hierarchy induced by a reorganization plan
implemented in roughly 2,000 bank branches in India. We do so to investigate
how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit. We find that increased
hierarchization of a branch induces credit rationing, reduces loan performance, and
generates standardization in loan contracts. Additionally, we find that hierarchical structures
perform better in environments characterized by a high degree of corruption, highlighting
the benefits of hierarchies in restraining rent-seeking activities. Overall, our results are
consistent with the view that valuable information may be lost in hierarchical structures.
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Over recent years, there has been a substantial change in the lending
landscape, with banks becoming larger, more globalized, and more complex
(Mester 2012; Herring and Carmassi 2012). While there is evidence that banks
might benefit from economies of scale (Focarelli and Panetta 2003), it is argued
that hierarchical structures may be inferior when it comes to granting loans
to small and medium sized enterprises (Stein 2002). Given the importance
of small and entrepreneurial firms for innovation and economic growth, it is
plausible that the shift toward hierarchical organizations hampers growth. In
this paper, we examine how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of
credit.
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There is now growing recognition that organizational design matters (Radner
1993; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Garicano 2000;
Dessein 2002). However, despite the abundance of theoretical literature on
this topic, empirical research has been rather scant.1 Two obstacles hinder
empirical research in this area. The first impediment comes from the paucity
of good micro-level data. A researcher not only needs detailed data on the
organizational design of banks, but also requires comprehensive information
on outcome variables, to identify the effect of changes in organizational design.
The second problem relates to the classic endogeneity problem. Even if one
is fortunate enough to gain access to organizational-level micro data, one
still has to grapple with the fact that the choice of organizational design is
not random. While cross-sectional studies are informative about the plausible
relationship, they are plagued by the problem of omitted variables. To make
any causal claims, the researcher has to seek some exogenous variation in the
organizational hierarchy.
In this paper, we use micro-level data from a large bank in India with roughly
2,000 branches, to examine how organizational hierarchy affects lending. The
data set offers not only comprehensive information on financial contracts of
individual borrowers but also micro-details on the organizational design of all
branches of the bank. In particular, it provides a measure of organizational
hierarchy: the number of managerial layers within a bank branch, where more
layers capture a greater degree of hierarchization.
We exploit changes in the organizational design, brought about by a bank-
level, predetermined reorganizational rule, and a difference-in-differences
(DID) research design. Specifically, a branch receives an upgrade if its total
business (deposits and loans) exceeds a certain threshold for eight quarters in a
row. The reverse is true for a downgrade. The upgrade adds a new managerial
layer to a branch office – the branch is now headed by a more senior manager,
who by virtue of her seniority in the bank can approve larger loans. Thus,
the upgrade generates two simultaneous affects. The addition of a new layer
increases the hierarchical distance for smaller loans. The opposite is true for
larger loans that can be approved internally after an upgrade due to the higher
loan approval limit of the more senior manager. To allow for comparability,
our experiment examines whether the lending behavior for loans that can be
approved in the lowest managerial layer changes with the addition of another
managerial layer.2
The following example illustrates the empirical strategy of the paper.
Consider a level 2 branch that is upgraded to a level 3 branch. Further assume
1 Some notable contributions include Berger et al. (2005), Liberti and Mian (2009), Canales and Nanda (2012),
and Liberti et al. (2015, 2017).
2 It should be noted that all branches that have the same level are standardized with a nearly identical organizational
design. Furthermore, the level of the branch (levels 1, 2, and 3) is directly linked to the seniority of the branch
manager presiding it. Put differently, the approval limit of a branch comes from the approval limit of the branch
manager.
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that the level 1 branch has the authority to approve loans below USD 5,000, the
level 2 branch has the power to approve loans up to USD 10,000 and the level
3 branch has an approval limit of USD 20,000. Any loan above these limits
would have to be sent to a higher level regional office3 for its approval, as it
falls outside the branch’s loan approval limits. We compare how the lending
behavior of a bank branch changes with the hierarchization for loans that are
below the USD 5,000 threshold. To control for time trends and other omitted
factors, our control group is another bank branch of the same bank in the same
district in the same quarter.4
Existing theories posit that the cost of communicating and transmitting
information increases with hierarchization (Radner 1993; Bolton and
Dewatripont 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Garicano 2000; Dessein 2002;
Stein 2002). To the extent that hierarchy impedes information production (Stein
2002), it is natural to expect implications on bank lending. While the effect of
information on lending can be rather subtle, the canonical models of credit
argue that improving information in credit markets facilitates lending and
broadens access to finance (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Because decentralization
in decision-making increases banks’ ability to generate information, we expect
there to be more lending (i.e., less credit rationing) in decentralized structures.
In a similar vein, it is natural to expect that better information would allow
banks to target credit to more profitable projects and away from less profitable
ones, thus increasing the overall profitability of their portfolio. Furthermore,
to the extent that better information allows the banks to discriminate between
borrowers, one would expect a greater dispersion in loan contract terms (Cornell
and Welch 1996; Cerqueiro et al. 2010; Rajan et al. 2015).
We find that organizational hierarchy affects both the quantity and the quality
of loans originated by the bank. Specifically, we observe that an increase in
hierarchy results in a 9.9% decline in total new loans issued by the bank branch
and a 5.4% decline in the average loan size. Furthermore, we find that an
increase in organizational hierarchy leads to a 4.5% reduction in the number of
small retail borrowers. On examining the performance of these loans, we find
that there is a substantial drop in the quality of loans after a branch becomes
more hierarchical. Delinquencies of loans are 30% higher, and returns 15%
lower. Overall, our results support the view that better information is generated
in more decentralized branches.
3 If a borrower requests a loan above a branch office’s limit, the request will be referred to (1) a regional office,
(2) a zonal office, or (3) the central office. A regional office’s approval limits are above those of any branch in
the region; a zonal office’s are above all regional offices in that zone; and the central office has no approval limit.
Thus, a more senior office deals with loan applications that a branch office has to pass on because of sanctioning
limits.
4 To sharpen our identification strategy further, we saturate our regression specifications by including the city
interacted with quarter fixed effects. We are thus comparing the effect of a change in the organizational design
on the lending of a treated branch to that of a control group in the same city in the same quarter. We also add
a branch-specific linear time trend, the most stringent specification, to account for differences in growth rates.
The results are reported in Internet Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
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To further sharpen our analysis, we examine the second moment of contract
terms on loan agreements, in a similar spirit to Rajan et al. (2015).5 Rajan et al.
(2015) argue that an increase in information should increase the variance of
the contract terms, as it allows banks to discriminate amongst borrowers. With
better information, banks can target credit to more profitable borrowers and
away from less profitable ones (to weed out bad borrowers). Consistent with
this prediction, we find that a new layer in the hierarchy reduces the variance
of contract terms (loan size) and generates contract standardization.
As pointed out above, higher level branches are headed by more senior
managers, who have the authority (granted by the central office) to approve
larger loans. Thus, these “large” loans are approved internally after an upgrade.
We find that after hierarchization, a branch issues more of the “large” loans
and generates more information on them. Given that these loans underwent a
reduction in organizational distance, the results provide additional support for
the view that an increase in organizational hierarchy reduces the information
produced on loans.
This generates an interesting trade-off for the branch. While the upgraded
branch loses out on small loans, it gains on larger loans that are now processed
inside the branch. Interestingly, however, we find that the gains in large loans
do not offset the losses on small loans. To assess the overall effect of branch-
level reorganizations, however, one has to evaluate the profitability of the bank.
Because upgrading a branch frees up resources at regional or higher level
offices, these offices can be more effective in other bank-level assignments,
such as business development and risk management. Our analysis focuses on
only branch-level profitability, and not on the overall profitability of the bank.
It should be noted, however, that during our sample the profitability of the
bank increased. In addition, the bank opened new branches in 43 previously
unbanked districts, thereby allowing it to access new markets. Thus, the overall
effect for the bank is likely to be positive. Because we do not have a control
group for the bank-level analysis, we refrain from making any causal claims
on the overall profitability of the bank.
Next, we investigate how organizational hierarchy interacts with corruption.
Delegation in the presence of corruption may be a double-edged sword (Tirole
1986; Banerjee et al. 2013). Delegation provides an extra incentive for an
agent to perform a task. However, when the agent’s incentives are not aligned
with those of the principal, it may be worthwhile taking this discretion away.
To understand how organizational hierarchy interacts with rent extraction, we
compare the effects in more corrupt states to those in less corrupt ones. Our
proxy for corruption is provided by Transparency International. The index is
particularly useful for our study, because it examines corruption in banking
services. It measures the fraction of respondents who actually paid a bribe for
5 A similar point is also raised by Cornell and Welch (1996) and Cerqueiro et al. (2010).
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obtaining these services. The study points out that the majority of these bribes
were paid to secure a loan.6 Our estimates indicate that for corrupt states the
effects of hierarchization are significantly reduced, highlighting the benefits of
hierarchical structures in corrupt environments.
Results thus far are consistent with the view that an increase in organizational
hierarchy adversely affects lending. However, it is plausible that other
contemporaneous changes may have affected lending. As a first check, we
confirm that our results remain strong after controlling for local shocks to
credit demand within the same district and the same city.7 We also verify that
our results are not driven by changes in branch managers. We carry out many
other robustness tests and discuss some alternative stories in Section 6.
This paper adds to the literature on organizational hierarchy and information
production. Theories in this area can be broadly categorized into one of
two strands. The first one deals with information transmission in teams with
incentive conflicts (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Stein 2002). The second one
examines information processing in teams without incentive problems. These
theories argue that hierarchy might be inferior, when communicating and
processing information is very costly (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Garicano
2000). Both sets of theories predict that organizational hierarchy might lead
to difficulties in processing and communicating information. This paper
documents that organizational hierarchy leads to distortions in information
production, but it is silent about which of the two classes of theories generates
our results.
Our work is closest to Liberti and Mian (2009) and Liberti (2017), who show
that more hierarchical organizational structures tend to rely more heavily on
objective rather than subjective information.8 Liberti et al. (2015) examine how
banks change their organizational design in response to a change in external
information with the introduction of a credit registry. Canales and Nanda (2012)
document that banks with less discretionary power at branch offices are less
responsive to the competitive environment. Qian et al. (2015) find that when
the loan approval is delegated to an individual rather than a committee, the
information quality improves. Finally, Cerqueiro et al. (2010) study whether
higher dispersion in interest rates is consistent with more discretion in loan
6 For robustness, we also proxy for corruption by focusing on branches in the so-called “BIMARU states,” (Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) which have been singled out for corruption (Kumar 2007). Our
results remain qualitatively the same.
7 The results are also robust to linear branch-level time trends. The results on city-quarter fixed effects and linear
time trends are reported in Internet Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
8 A strand of literature argues that as banks become larger, they decrease lending to retail customers and small
businesses, borrowers being particularly dependent on subjective information. Their focus, however, is not directly
related to organizational hierarchy. Some of the most notable works include Berger and Udell (1995), Berger
et al. (1995, 1999), Strahan and Wetson (1998), Berger et al. (1998, 2001), Cole et al. (2004), and Degryse et al.
(2009).
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approval.9 We complement these papers by examining how a change in
organizational hierarchy affects banks’ ability to generate information and to
allocate credit. Furthermore, we provide new insights by highlighting some of
the benefits associated with hierarchies in corrupt areas.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on distance in credit markets.
These studies argue that the proximity between the borrower and the lender
mitigates the information asymmetry (Petersen and Rajan 1995; Petersen and
Rajan 2002; Degryse and Ongena 2005; Mian 2006; Liberti and Mian 2009;
Alessandrini et al. 2009; Agarwal and Hauswald 2010; Brown et al. 2012; Berg
et al. 2013; Fisman et al. 2017). The key distinction here is that we focus on
hierarchical distance, as opposed to geographical distance (Petersen and Rajan
2002) or cultural distance (Fisman et al. 2017).
1. Theoretical Motivation
In this section, we briefly discuss the main theories with implications on
organizational hierarchy and information. The first set of models considers
information processing and communication in teams without incentive
problems. Generally, these theories argue that organizational hierarchy is less
attractive when communication costs are large. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)
consider an environment where a firm trades off gains from specialization
against costs of communication.10 In their model, specialized agents collect
information that is then communicated to the decision maker. If the costs
of communication are high, specialization becomes less attractive. Similarly,
Garicano (2000) considers knowledge based hierarchies. In his model, higher
layers are solvers of complex problems, while lower layers are routine problem
solvers. He proposes a trade-off between the cost of communication (matching
a problem with the problem solver) and the cost of acquiring knowledge (the
front line can pick up necessary skills and problem solvers are not necessary).
If the costs of communication outweigh the costs of acquiring information,
hierarchy is less attractive.
The second set of models analyzes information processing in teams with
incentive problems. Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002) argue that
organizational hierarchy creates an ex ante disincentive to collect information.
In their model, the subordinate is responsible for collecting information to be
transmitted to the manager. Because the manager makes the final decision, there
is a positive probability that the suggestion of a subordinate will be overruled.
This likelihood of interference dulls the subordinate’s incentive to exert effort
9 Another notable contribution is by Berger et al. (2005), who argue that usage of soft information is negatively
associated with the size of a bank. A conjecture behind their empirical strategy is that bank size is a good proxy
for organizational design. In this respect, the key advantage of our paper is the ability to differentiate between
organizational design and size effects. Therefore, we can nail down the effects induced by organizational hierarchy
and protect ourselves against the potential capture of a spurious correlation.
10 Other notable contributions include Radner (1993), Van Zandt (1999), and Hart and Moore (2005).
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in collecting information ex ante. A similar point is raised by cheap talk models
(most notably, Crawford and Sobel, 1982, Dessein, 2002). The informed agent
sends a signal to a principal who will act on it and affect the welfare of both. If
their incentives are misaligned, the agent is prone to misreport the true quality of
their project. In this spirit, Harris and Raviv (1998) exploit the cost of auditing
the information that is submitted by a subordinate. If the audit costs are very
high, the decision will be delegated to the subordinate. In other words, hierarchy
becomes less attractive in the presence of high audit costs and misaligned
interests.
The effect of information on lending is rather complex. The cannonical
models of credit predict that better information on borrowers facilitates lending
and broadens access to finance (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).11 However, the effect
of information on overall profitability is less ambiguous. Better information on
borrowers allows a bank to target loans to more profitable projects and away
from less profitable ones, thereby increasing overall profitability. In addition,
Cornell and Welch (1996) and Rajan et al. (2015) argue that better information
is likely to increase the variance on loan contract terms, because the bank can
use the extra information to increase lending to creditworthy borrowers and
reduce lending to riskier borrowers.
In this paper, we document that organizational hierarchy affects lending. It
should be noted that while we interpret our results through the lens of the two
sets of organizational theories described above, the paper is not a horse race
between them.
2. Data
The data for this study come from a large, state-owned Indian bank operating
over 2,000 branches. The data set is rich in detail. It contains detailed
information not only on all loan contracts but also on the organizational design
of all of the bank’s branches.12 At the contract level, it includes the loan balance
outstanding, the interest rate, the maturity, the type of collateral, the collateral
value, and the number of days late in payment, among other information. On
the organizational front, it provides us with information on the number of
managerial layers in each branch office, the overall seniority of each manager
and their loan approval limit. The sample spans 29 quarters from 1999 Q1 to
2006 Q1.
2.1 Loans and borrowers
We focus on first-time, individual (retail) borrowers. During our sample,
the bank issued 1.75 million such contracts. For the purposes of this study,
11 See de Meza and Webb (1987), who argue that overinvestment may occur in the presence of asymmetric
information.
12 For confidentiality reasons, we are unable to disclose the exact number of branches.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Mean SD p1 p50 p99
Branch-quarter statistics (N=54,079)
New credit (1,000s of rupees) 1,175.1 2,063.4 31.0 726.4 6,650.1
Mean loan amount (1,000s of rupees) 56.0 43.5 7.8 42.8 216.5
# of borrowers 24.5 39.1 2.0 15.0 143.0
Fraction of borrowers delinquent within a year 0.050 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.500
Fraction of debt delinquent within a year 0.042 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.570
Return on loans (value-weighted) 0.070 0.079 −0.244 0.083 0.150
Interest rate 0.11 0.018 0.082 0.116 0.158
Maturity (years) 4.15 2.26 0.60 4.00 11.11
Collateral-to-loan (median) 6.75 406.98 0.00 1.42 19.12
SD debt (1,000s of rupees) 57.6 44.7 2.3 47.9 184.1
IQR debt (1,000s of rupees) 54.6 66.8 0.7 28.2 309.8
Branch level 1.4 0.6 1 1 3
Branch level (treated) 1.7 0.7 1 2 3
This table reports branch-quarter summary statistics of new individual loans. The variable Branch level is a
number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least
hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. We report the mean, standard deviation,
the 1st percentile, median, and the 99th percentile for all the variables.
we aggregate the loan-level information and obtain 54,079 branch-quarter
observations. In Table 1, we present means, medians, standard deviations, and
the 1st and the 99th percentiles for the main variables of interest. The loan
amounts are expressed in rupees.13
In a quarter, the average branch lends to 24 new retail borrowers, with a
mean loan size of 56,000 rupees (roughly USD 1,300). Furthermore, the equally
weighted delinquency rate, defined as 60 or more days late in repayment within a
year after the origination of the loan, is 5.0%. In comparison, the value-weighted
delinquency rate is only 4.2%, suggesting that larger debt is less likely to be
late in repayment and is issued to better quality borrowers. In addition, the
average value-weighted return on loans is 7.0%. Moreover, 90% of all loans
are secured with a median ratio of collateral to loan value of 1.42. Finally, the
average maturity and interest rate are 4.2 years and 11.4%, respectively.
2.2 Organizational design
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the managerial hierarchy of the bank. In total,
there are eight management levels. Employees in each layer are comparable in
terms of their responsibilities, discretionary power as defined by their maximum
loan approval limit, experience, and salary. The top five layers, starting with
Assistant General Manager, constitute the senior management team. While they
are mainly involved in business development, they also originate large loans.
The lower ranked employees consist of junior managers, senior managers and
chief managers who focus more on the operation side of lending as managers
in branch offices. Every ranked employee has a credit origination limit, and
that limit increases with the rank of the official.
13 The average exchange rate during our sample period was 0.022 USD per rupee.
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Figure 1
Organizational design
The bank’s organizational design consists of the eight layers described in the figure. A higher-ranking manager
has more decisional power and authority. The top-five layers, marked with an asterisk, are the senior management
team, mainly involved in business development. The lower three focus on the operational side of lending.
The organizational chart of the bank is as follows (see Figure 2): The
Chairman and the Executive Directors of the bank operate from the central office
and set all bank-wide policies, which are then executed in other lower-level
branches. Zonal offices, which represent distinct geographical zones across the
country, operate under the central office. Within each zone, several regional
offices are responsible for business development in different regions of a zone.
Finally, under each regional office, a large number of standardized branch
offices (2,000+) exist and are headed by different levels of managers.
For the organizational design of branches, the branch head can be seen as
the chief executive of the branch. They are responsible for the whole business
of the branch, within the policy guidelines that are set by the central office. The
branch manager can decide on whether to grant a loan and has considerable
discretion over the terms of the loan contract, with the exception of the interest
rate, which is set by the central office. For instance, all home improvement
loans have the same interest rate as car loans with a maturity of up to 5 years
(see, for example, Internet Appendix Table A1). In total, there are three branch
structures (see Figure 3). The smallest branch (level 1) is typically headed by a
junior branch manager, the next branch up (level 2) is headed by a senior branch
manager, and finally the branch on level 3 is overseen by a chief manager.
Higher-level branches have more layers of hierarchy associated with them.
For example, in level 1 branches, branch managers directly interact with the
borrowers. However, a level 3 branch would have three layers: junior managers,
senior managers, and a chief manager. It should be noted that while the loan
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Figure 2
Internal organizational design
The figure shows a schematic illustration of the bank and its branches. Each level has a specified approval limit
on the size of the loan. If the loan falls outside of the branch manager’s limits, it is sent to the regional, the zonal,
or the head office for approval, depending on the size of the loan.
officers (or junior managers in our setting) in a branch can approve loans that
are within their approval limit, the senior-level manager (if there is one in that
branch) can overrule those decisions.
The lending process is relatively simple (see Figure 4). The borrower
approaches the bank and fills in the application form. The application may be
rejected by the loan officer, which ends the whole process. If not, the loan officer
evaluates the loan application to assess the borrower’s credit risk. The loan
officer and the borrower then meet to discuss the needs, collateral requirements
and other possibilities. Once a loan officer and a borrower agree on the loan
terms, the loan is approved by the loan officer (junior manager) if the agreed
size of the loan falls within their discretionary powers (i.e., below 500k rupees).
If the loan exceeds the loan officer’s approval limit, it goes to the next authority
up for approval. If the requested loan is above the discretionary powers of the
branch manager, the loan application, along with the branch’s assessment, is
forwarded to a more senior manager in a regional, a zonal, or a central office.
Nevertheless, the decision on whether to reject the application or send it for
approval outside the branch remains with the head of the branch. On average, a
loan application is assessed within 10 days when approved within a branch. The
assessment period increases to 2 months when evaluated externally, because
the credit files were mailed using postal services during our sample period.
In terms of the geographic distribution, the bank is highly dispersed across
India (Figure 5). We created a spatial map and calculated distances between
branches, to better understand the market structure. Specifically, for a level 1
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Figure 3
Branch office design
The figure shows a schematic illustration of the bank’s branches. Each level has a specified approval limit on
the size of the loan. If the loan falls outside of the branch manager’s limits, it is sent to the regional, the zonal,
or the head office for approval, depending on the size of the loan. Our sample consists of three organizational
designs: decentralized (level 1), medium hierarchy (level 2), and centralized (level 3). The more hierarchical the
branch, the higher the approval limits of its manager. Our analysis focuses on all new individual loans eligible for
approval at any organizational design, that is, the loans that fall below the limit of the least hierarchical branch
(the triangles at the bottom of the chart).
Figure 4
Loan approval process
The flowchart describes the loan approval process. It starts with a loan application at the branch office and
continues until the loan is approved or rejected at either the branch or another external office.
branch, the closest levels 2 and 3 branches are 23 and 90 kilometers away,
respectively (see Table 2). For a level 2 branch, the closest level 3 branch is 73
kilometers away. On average, there are 1.67 branches per city. Out of all cities,
52% (or 1,396) have only one branch of the bank. Similarly, we find that there
are 1.38 branches per ZIP code and 1.38 branches per banking area, as defined
by the Reserve Bank of India.14 57% of ZIP codes (1,527) and 66% of banking
areas (1,844) have a single branch of this bank. It is worthwhile to note that
transportation in India, particularly in rural areas, is not very well developed.
14 RBI banking areas are smaller in size than ZIP code areas; India has 39,000 RBI banking areas. The average size
of the banking area is 69.9 square kilometers. In comparison, an average ZIP code in the United States is 233
square kilometers.
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Figure 5
Geographical distribution of branches, weighted by total lending
The center indicates the location of the branch by postal code. The size corresponds to the total amount lent in
the branch in 2006.
The 20-kilometer distance can come at a considerable travel cost.15 As a rule
borrowers have to apply at their nearest branch.16
Table 3 reports the summary statistics by branch level. As can be seen
from panel A, more hierarchical branches originate larger loans, serve
fewer customers, and their loan book performs better, as measured by both
delinquencies and returns. Hierarchical branches, however, are more likely to be
located in metropolitan areas. Because borrowers might differ in terms of their
size and profitability across geographical locations, a simple cross-sectional
analysis could capture the heterogeneity of clientele, degree of competition, or
15 It should be noted that to travel 100 kilometers by public transport (bus) takes about 3 hours on average. This
number is significantly higher in rural areas, which are deprived of proper roads.
16 For SMEs, the loan is handled by the branch that is nearest to the location of the business. This allows the branch
to monitor the loan and its collateral.
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Table 2
Distance to the closest branch within the bank
Branch hierarchy Regional Zonal
1 2 3 office office
H
ie
ra
rc
hy 1 12.08 22.79 90.03 131.46 204.48
2 15.47 18.18 73.82 116.25 193.08
3 7.23 6.70 28.12 54.14 178.38
The table reports the average spatial distance in kilometers to
the closest branch, regional office, or zonal office of the same
bank. The location of branches is at the ZIP code level. Each row
corresponds to the hierarchy of each branch from which the distance
is calculated. For instance, for a branch with hierarchy 1, the closest
branch with hierarchy 2 is 22.79 kilometers. For a branch with
hierarchy 1, the average distance from regional and zonal offices is
131.46 and 204.48 kilometers.
Table 3
Summary statistics: Cross-section
Fraction of debt
Mean loan amount # of borrowers del. within a year Return on loans
Branch level (# Obs) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A. All areas
Level 1 (34,068) 46,303 35,698 24.65 30.48 0.046 0.116 0.066 0.083
Level 2 (17,139) 70,231 48,438 25.27 52.53 0.039 0.105 0.074 0.073
Level 3 (2,872) 85,918 57,944 17.94 35.20 0.024 0.083 0.078 0.067
B. Metropolitan areas
Level 1 90,169 60,584 13.65 14.89 0.034 0.107 0.084 0.067
Level 2 87,127 59,267 13.31 13.76 0.034 0.104 0.081 0.078
Level 3 92,702 63,363 12.06 15.27 0.022 0.083 0.080 0.071
This table reports branch-quarter summary statistics of new individual loans across organizational designs. Panel
A considers all geographic areas, and panel B considers only metropolitan areas. The variable Branch level is a
number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least
hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. We report the mean and the standard
deviation for all the variables.
other omitted variables rather than organizational design. In panel B, we restrict
the sample to only metropolitan areas and find that branches are fairly similar
across all levels.17 Our empirical strategy employs a difference-in differences
research design to control for these omitted factors.
2.3 Employee incentives
Managers are evaluated annually, based on a range of criteria. These include
quantitative measures such as the amount and profitability of lending, as
well as qualitative considerations such as employee skill development and
effective customer communication. These managers are held accountable for
loan defaults even after moving branches, on average up to 3 years. After that
the responsibility is transferred to a manager at the branch where the loan was
originated.
17 The results are also similar for rural and urban areas.
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While there is limited incentive pay, managers are motivated through the
possibility of promotion to a higher rank or a better posting. Successful
managers may be sent to locales with more or better perks such as higher pay
(overseas), a larger house, a company car, or control over a larger portfolio (large
branches). In a similar vein, poor performers might be moved to less desirable
places, which have a weak infrastructure and poor schools. Accordingly,
managers have strong incentives to issue profitable loans and score high on
other qualitative dimensions that affect their annual evaluations.
3. Empirical Specification
Our identification strategy employs a branch restructuring policy that is driven
by predefined rules. A given branch is upgraded (downgraded) if over the
last 2 years, the average outstanding balance of the combined loans and
deposits exceeds (falls below) a fixed cutoff. In the event of an upgrade, a
branch is allocated more resources, including more personnel to meet the rising
demand for services in that district, and vice versa. The branch’s organizational
hierarchy is also changed to resemble other branches on the same organizational
level (see Figure 6). Because managers in a more senior level can approve
larger loans, we focus on loans that are below the lowest approval limit, that
is, that of junior managers. Therefore, our experiment examines whether the
lending behavior for loans that can be approved in the lowest managerial layer
changes with the addition of another managerial layer. During our sample
period, roughly 500 of all branches were reorganized.
We wish to highlight a few points about the reorganization of branches. First,
these cutoffs were fixed in the central office by a new CEO of the bank, before
the start of our sample. Thus, from the perspective of a single borrower, the
organizational design of a branch is exogenous. Second, we again stress that
we are examining the loans that are eligible for internal approval within all
branches, that is, we are looking at loans of under 500,000 rupees (approx.
USD 11,000). This allows us to analyze a similar set of loans across all types
of organizational levels, ensuring that the approval limit does not interfere with
the loan decisions. It is important to emphasize that most of the branches that
we examine have loan approval limits that are significantly above this cutoff
(more than double), so this constraint is not binding for most of the loans that
we examine.
Our empirical strategy attempts to identify the effect of organizational
hierarchy on the parameters of interest (e.g., contract standardization,
delinquencies, or return on loans). We employ a difference-in-differences
(DID) strategy and compare branches that were subject to a change in their
organizational design against a control group of branches that were not affected
by these reorganizations. Thus, the empirical specification is given by
ybq =τq +τb +δBranch levelbq +ηbq, (1)
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Figure 6
Identification strategy
The figure describes our difference-in-differences (DID) identification strategy. We estimate the effect of
organizational design on a set of loans eligible for approval both before and after the treatment. Each quarter,
the treatment group consists of all branches that are reorganized. Then we compare our estimated effect on the
treatment group with the results of similar branches whose organizational design was left unchanged (control
group).
where the dependent variable (e.g., defaults) is measured at the branch-quarter
level; q and b index the quarter and the branch, respectively. Branch levelbq
stands for the organizational design of branch b in quarter q. It is a number
between 1 and 3, where the lowest and highest values describe decentralized and
hierarchical (i.e., four-layer) branches, respectively. The branch fixed effects
(τb) absorb any time invariant branch characteristics. The quarterly dummies(
τq
)
control for aggregate time trends. This strategy identifies the effect of
organizational structure on the credit market outcomes, controlling for time
and branch invariant effects. The coefficient δ is our DID estimate of the effect
of organizational hierarchy on, for example, the default rates.
A concern might be that some credit demand shocks coincide with the
reorganization of branches. We control for this by including district-quarter
fixed effects.18 In such a specification, one compares the default rates of a
reorganized branch against a branch that was not reorganized in the same district
and in the same quarter. If there is any aggregate change in the default rates at the
district-quarter level, this specification would control for that. For robustness,
we have saturated our model with city-quarter fixed effects and find similar
18 There are 362 geographical districts in India. Each district has 7 branches on average.
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results.19 With a dynamic specification, we show that there are no pretreatment
trends to any of our results.
4. Results
4.1 Lending
We begin by reporting the effect of the organizational design on new credit
quantities for new borrowers in Columns 1 to 3 in Table 4, estimated using
the difference-in-differences methodology (specification 1). The estimated
coefficient of interest is that on Branch level, a number between 1 and 3,
where 1 stands for a decentralized branch and 3 for a hierarchical branch.
Both columns include quarter and branch fixed effects. We find that an increase
in organizational hierarchy reduces the total lending to new borrowers by 9.9%
(Column 1) and the number of new borrowers by 4.5% (Column 2). The
difference between the two values implies that the average loan declined by
5.4% (Column 3).
A concern regarding the above might be that our results are affected by
simultaneous credit demand shocks. To account for this and other similar
concerns, we saturate our main specification by including interacted quarter
with district fixed effects. This specification controls for all time variation within
those districts. As a result, we exploit the within-district variation between
treated and nontreated branches. To the extent that local shocks affect all
branches at a district level, such shocks are differenced out in our specification.
As Columns 4 through 6 show, saturating the specification does not affect the
qualitative nature of our results.20
In Columns 7 through 9, we investigate the dynamic effects of the
organizational change. This test allows us to rule out differential pretreatment
trends between treated and control branches. We replace the Branch level with
four variables to track the effect of organizational design before and after the
change: Before2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) for a branch that
will be upgraded (downgraded) in one or two quarters; Before0 is a dummy
variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded this quarter or one
quarter ago; After2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was
upgraded (downgraded) two or three quarters ago; and After4+ is a dummy
variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) four or
more quarters ago. The variable Before2 allows us to assess whether any effects
can be found prior to the change. In fact, the estimated coefficient on the Before2
is economically small and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, we find that
the coefficient on the Before0 is smaller than those on the After2 and After4+,
19 The results remain qualitatively the same if we add a branch-level linear time trend. The results are reported in
Internet Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
20 The results are also robust to the inclusion of city-quarter fixed effects and a linear branch-level time trend. The
results are reported in Internet Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
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suggesting that the effect increases over the two quarters. In terms of the timing
of the reorganization, we find that the effect on total lending is permanent after
two quarters (Column 7), whereas the effect on average loan starts at the quarter
of reorganization. The effect on the number of borrowers is slightly delayed and
appears after four quarters. All in all, these results provide support to the view
that information frictions generated by hierachization adversely affect lending
quantities (see, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). In the next section we examine
how organizational hierarchy affects the quality of loans originated by a branch.
4.2 Loan repayment
If organizational hierarchy introduces information frictions, then one may
expect a lower quality of originated loans (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). To examine
the effect of organizational hierarchy on future loan repayment, we estimate
specification 1. We classify a loan as delinquent if it is more than 60 days past
due within a year since origination. As before, we aggregate the loan-level
default measure and obtain a branch-quarter delinquency rate.
We find that an increase in hierarchy increases loan delinquencies. The
coefficients on the Branch level in Table 5 are economically large and
statistically significant at 1%, for both equally weighted and value-weighted
default rates in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. The absolute increase of value-
weighted default rates is 1.4%, implying a 33% increase in the default relative
to the mean value-weighted default rate of 4.2%. In comparison, the effect
on the equally weighted measure is 1.0%, corresponding to a 20% increase
relative to the mean. Moreover, the effects remain strong after controlling for
local demand shocks through quarter-district fixed effects (Column 3).21 We
also find a significant difference between the estimated value-weighted and
equally weighted measures (Column 4). This is consistent with the view that
less hierarchical branches are better informed and can allocate funds to more
profitable projects. Finally, the dynamic effects of the change in organizational
design (Columns 5 and 6) indicate that there is no pretreatment trend.
4.3 Return on loans
So far, we have shown that an increase in hierarchy leads to lower lending
quantities and worsening of the credit quality of originated loans. To complete
the picture, we next examine the effect of hierarchy on the profitability of loans.
To calculate the return on loans (ROL), factors such as recovery rates and other
contract terms need to be considered. We adapt the Khwaja and Mian (2005)
methodology to generate this metric.22
21 The results are also robust to the inclusion of city-quarter fixed effects and a linear branch-level time trend. The
results are reported in Internet Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
22 The best way to estimate returns is to compare cash lent versus cash returned. However, a large proportion of
loans are repaid after the end of our sample, because the average maturity is 4.15 years. Because of censoring,
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Table 5
Effect of organizational design on loan repayment
Defaults (60+ days late)
Equally Value Value Difference Equally Value
weighted weighted weighted (2)-(1) weighted weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) [0.008]
Before−2 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Before0 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
After2 0.009** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.003)
After4+ 0.012*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079
Adj-R2 0.234 0.183 0.271 0.234 0.183
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y N Y Y
Quarter-district FEs N N Y N N
This table reports the effect of organizational structure on loan repayment (Columns 1, 2, and 3) and its dynamics
(Columns 5 and 6), using specification (1). Column 3 reports the effect on value-weighted default rates after
controlling for local demand shocks through quarter-district fixed effects instead of quarterly fixed effects.
Column 4 reports the difference between the estimated coefficients on equally weighted and value-weighted
default rates. Defaults are measured as a fraction of loans that are over 60 days late 1-year forward, estimated
at the branch-quarter level. The sample considers individual, new loans that can be approved within any branch.
The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value
(level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. Before−2
is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) in one or two quarters. Before0
is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded this quarter or one quarter ago. After2 is a
dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) two or three quarters ago. After4+
is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) four quarters ago or more. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. p-values are reported in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
We calculate the lifetime ROL for each loan separately, and then we aggregate
the loan-level returns at the branch-quarter level. The return on a loan is
estimated as follows:
ROLb,i,q =
qˆ∑
q˜=q
ωb,i,q˜
[(
1+rb,i,q˜
)(
1−160+b,i,q˜
)
+160+b,i,q˜ ρb,i,q˜
]
, (2)
where rbiq˜ is the quarterly interest rate for a borrower i at a branchb in the quarter
q, 160+biq˜ is a dummy variable equal to one if a loan is delinquent for 60 or more
days within a year since the origination, ρbiq˜ is the expected recovery rate; qˆ is
the quarter when the loan is repaid in full, when the loan is 60+ days late, or the
last quarter in our data set (whichever comes first). The important difference
between us and Khwaja and Mian (2005) is that we use value-weighted returns
we have to make assumptions about the repayment. Like with defaults, to be certain that a loan truly defaults,
one needs to observe a write-off, which might occur after the end of our sample. Therefore, we use delinquency,
when a borrower has missed payments for 60 or more days, as a measure of default.
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over time
(
ω=Loanbiq/
∑q¯
q˜=q Loanbiq˜
)
.
23 The weighting is important, because
loans tend to have higher outstanding amounts in the beginning, and often, if a
loan defaults, a considerable fraction is already repaid. A simple time-average
would overestimate the effect of a default. All in all, the value-weighted ROL
is a better measure for estimating the impact on a branch’s performance than
the equally weighted measure.
When a loan becomes delinquent, the expected return is given by the
following identity:
ρb,i,q˜ =ηagei ·δ{s,u} +
(
1−ηagei
)(
1+rb,i,q˜
)
, (3)
where ηagei is the estimated value-weighted default probability, conditional
on the age when the loan becomes 60+ days delinquent; and δ{s,u} is the
value-weighted recovery rate from the defaulted loans, computed as the value
recovered against the defaulted principal and interest due for secured (s) and
unsecured (u) loans separately.
To account for censoring in our data (i.e., not all loans are repaid or default by
the end of Q1:2006), in the last quarter of the data set we calculate the expected
return on a loan in the following way:
Rb,i,q¯ =
(
1−σagei
)(
1+rb,i,q¯
)
+σagei ·δ{s,u}, (4)
where σagei is the transition probability of a healthy loan, or one that is less than
60 days late, defaulting eventually by loan age; and where rb,i,q˜ and δ{s,u} are
the quarterly interest and the recovery rates, respectively. We then replace the
term in brackets in the Equation (2) with the one calculated here (Rb,i,q¯) for all
healthy loans in Q1:2006. Lastly, the estimated default probabilities, required
for computing the return on loans, are plotted in Figure 7.
We estimate the recovery rates for each organizational level separately, as
well as whether or not the loan is secured. The recovery data are available only
for the first quarter of 2006. The estimated value-weighted recovery rate for
individual secured loans is 40%, whereas for unsecured loans it is only 16%,
reflecting the importance of the realization value of the collateral when seized
in default (see Table 6). Our average estimated recovery rate is similar to the
25% provided by the Doing Business database from World Bank (2013). For
robustness, we also check our results using three other recovery rates:24 25%
as suggested by the Doing Business Database of the World Bank, a pessimistic
15%, and an optimistic 50%. Qualitatively, the results remain the same.
Overall our results suggest that organizational hierarchy impedes information
production and adversely affects not only the quality of loans but also their
23 For robustness, we also follow the strategy employed in Khwaja and Mian (2005) and use time rather than value
weights in calculating individual loan returns (Equation (2)). As expected, we find slightly stronger results for
the returns with time weights, because such weights overestimate the effect of a default. That said, the difference
is so marginal that the effects are economically almost identical.
24 The results are available on request.
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Figure 7
Transition probabilities
The graphs plot the transition probabilities (value-weighted) of loans that subsequently defaulted (i.e., the legal
proceedings with the borrower are finalized). The plot on the left presents the default probabilities for loans that
are 60 or more days late, whereas the one on the right presents those for loans that are paid on time or are less
than 60 days late. We track loans from the quarter they become 60+ days late and plot the average loans that
default conditional on their age at the quarter becoming delinquent (panel A). Similarly, we track loans from
their origination quarter and plot the average loans that default conditional on the age of a loan (panel B). Both
graphs are smoothed using fractional-polynomial approximation.
Table 6
Recovery rates
Mean SE Obs.
(1) (2) (3)
Recovery rate (δ) Branch hierarchy:
Secured Decentralized 48.07 0.56 2,516
Medium 39.76 0.70 2,240
Centralized 40.77 1.69 358
Unsecured Decentralized 30.07 0.46 4,420
Medium 23.47 0.46 3,699
Centralized 23.28 1.02 595
The table reports the mean (Column 1) and the standard error (Column 2) of our
estimated recovery rates, which are used in return on loan calculations. Additionally,
Column 3 reports the number of observations used in calculating the rates. We report
value-weighted recovery rates from the defaulted loans computed as the value recovered
against the defaulted principal and interest due for both secured and unsecured loans.
Because of data limitations, the recovery rates are calculated only for loans written off
in the first quarter of 2006. Unfortunately, we do not have the data from other quarters.
profitability. We find that the return on the same set of loans decreases after a
branch becomes more hierarchical (Table 7). The value-weighted return on an
individual loan decreases by 100 basis points (bps) (Column 2). Given that every
quarter the bank earns 7.0% on every rupee lent (the value-weighted return), the
100-bps decline is equal to a 14% drop from the mean return. Similarly, for the
equally weighted measure, the 70-bps fall in return (Column 1) is equivalent to
a 10% slip in the branch’s performance. Further, the estimated results remain
unchanged after controlling for local demand shocks through quarter-district
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Table 7
Return on loans
ROL
Equally Value Value Difference Equally Value
weighted weighted weighted (2)-(1) weighted weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level −0.007*** −0.010*** −0.006*** −0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) [0.011]
Before−2 −0.001 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Before0 −0.007** −0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
After2 −0.003 −0.010***
(0.003) (0.002)
After4+ −0.008*** −0.012***
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079
Adj-R2 0.155 0.136 0.207 0.155 0.136
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y N Y Y
Quarter-district FEs N N Y N N
This table reports the effect of organizational structure on the equally weighted and value-weighted return on
loans (Columns 1, 2, and 3) and its dynamics (Columns 5 and 6) using specification (1). Column 3 reports the
effect on value-weighted returns after controlling for local demand shocks through quarter-district fixed effects
instead of quarterly fixed effects. Column 4 reports the difference between the estimated coefficients on equally
and value-weighted returns. The unit of analysis is branch-quarter return on loans. First, we estimate the return for
each loan, as defined in Equation (2). Then we aggregate the loan-level estimate at the branch-quarter level using
equal or value weights. The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level
1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches,
respectively. Before−2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) in one
or two quarters. Before0 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded this quarter or one
quarter ago. After2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) two or
three quarters ago. After4+ is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded)
four quarters ago or more. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. p-values
are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
fixed effects (Column 3) and do not have any pre-trend (Columns 5 and 6).25
Last, but not least, analogous to the delinquency result, we find a significant
difference of 30 bps between value- and equally weighted measures (Column
4). This further supports the view that hierarchy leads to frictions in information
production, suggesting that less hierarchical banks can allocate more money to
profitable projects.
4.4 Standardization of loan contracts
In this section, we sharpen the evidence that organizational hierarchy leads
to loss of information, by showing that contracts are more standardized in a
hierarchical structure. To capture the information content in loans, we use a
methodology similar in spirit to the procedure employed in Rajan et al. (2015)
(similar to Cornell and Welch 1996; Cerqueiro et al. 2010). The intuition for this
test can be understood using the following example. Consider two borrowers
25 The results are also robust to the inclusion of city-quarter fixed effects. The results are reported in Internet
Appendix Table A3.
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with identical hard information, but different soft information content. If a
flatter organizational structure provides lenders with better information, then
we should expect banks to discriminate between borrowers by giving more
loans to the “good” types and less loans to the “bad” types. In the absence
of such soft information, all borrowers with the same hard information would
obtain similar loans. Thus, an increase in information would be captured by an
increase in the dispersion of lending decisions.
4.4.1 Variance in quantity. In the first approach, we exploit two measures
that have been used in the literature to capture information through variation
in loan quantity: interquartile range and standard deviation of debt (see, for
instance, Fisman et al. 2017). Both measures possess similar characteristics.
The larger the amount of information, the larger the proxy. Using the difference-
in-differences methodology defined in specification 1, qualitatively, both
measures deliver the same result. Contracts become more standardized when a
branch is converted to a more hierarchical unit (see Table 8). The interquartile
range of debt (Column 1) and standard deviation of debt (Column 2) decrease
by 12.3% and 9.5%, respectively. Furthermore, these effects remain unchanged
from a qualitative point of view after absorbing all local shocks through quarter-
district fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4). Lastly, in Columns 5 and 6, we
investigate the dynamic effects and find no pre-trend. In fact, if anything, both
pre-trend coefficients show the opposite signs. Moreover, all of the effects
increase over time.
4.4.2 “Quasi" R-squared. The variance in the error term is an alternative
way to look at the contract standardization. Because contractual terms are
endogenous (jointly determined), some of the variation in the loan quantity
might be explained by the variation in other contract terms. For example, a
lender may increase the amount of a loan if a borrower pledges more collateral.
Thus, one wishes to examine the variance in the loan quantity conditional on
other contractual characteristics. The analysis of the error term permits that.
The finding that the variance in the error term increases with a decrease in the
organizational hierarchy suggests an information channel, controlling for all
other contractual characteristics.
More specifically, to measure changes in the variance of quantity conditional
on other contract terms, we run the following hedonic model:26
ybiq =τq +τb +θ
′Xbiq +	biq , (5)
where i denotes a borrower, q denotes a quarter, and b is a branch. The
dependent variable ybiq is the natural logarithm of the loan outstanding at
26 Because small borrowers are credit constrained in India (see, e.g., Banerjee et al. 2005), our estimates correspond
to the bank’s credit supply curve.
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the quarter of origination. The two fixed effects – τb and τq – capture the
time invariant components of each branch and aggregate time-series shocks
to all branches, respectively. Xbiq is the vector of control variables. The
vector of controls includes contract-specific characteristics, namely, maturity,
value of the collateral, gender, and product group fixed effects.27 The residual
	ˆbiq of this hedonic regression is the variation that is not explained by other
contractual characteristics.28 In graph-form, we find that hierarchical branches
are associated with more standardization. Figure 8 plots the kernel density
functions of the residuals for decentralized and hierarchical branches.29 For
the most hierarchical branches, the unexplained variation in loan quantity
is more centered around the mean (zero) than for the more flatly organized
branches, implying more contract standardization. As a final step, we calculate
the standard deviation of these error terms and scale them by the variance of
the dependent variable to generate a “quasi” R-squared. The lower the contract
standardization and the more information, the lower the measured R-squared.
Like for our results on variance in the quantity, we run our main DID
specification for the “quasi” R-squared. Studying the same set of loans before
and after the reorganization, we find that they become more standardized in a
more hierarchical structure (Column 3 in Table 8). The estimated coefficient
on the Branch level is negative and significant at 1%. In terms of economic
magnitudes, the introduction of an additional managerial layer increases the
contract standardization by roughly 5.3% when measured against the mean
“quasi” R-squared. Furthermore, the results remain qualitatively the same after
absorbing all local shocks through quarter-district fixed effects (Column 6).30
All in all, the findings on contract standardization support the view that a
hierarchical structure leads to distortions in information production.
Figure 9 plots the dynamics of “quasi” R-squared around the branch
reorganization that are estimated after controlling for branch and quarter fixed
effects. The figure investigates issues of other contemporaneous events that
might be driving the contract standardization and hence the change in the
organizational design. As can be seen, there is no pre-trend and the results
27 For brevity, we report the results of the hedonic regression in Internet Appendix Table A2. Because interest rates
are fixed, we exclude these from this specification.
28 Clearly, the error term contains both hard and soft information variables. If hierarchical organizations face
frictions in information production, it could be through both hard and soft information.
29 The residuals are standardized to account for the heterogeneity in the pool of borrowers across branches. To
fix ideas, imagine the following situation. The distribution of loans in branch A is wide (i.e., large standard
deviation) due to the significant heterogeneity among borrowers. On the other hand, the distribution of loans in
branch B is narrow. However, the estimated residuals in both cases are the same. Judging by the residuals, both
branches would look alike. This is not true, however. While the variation in errors is the same, the variation in
the dependent variable is larger for branch A. Thus, the model’s predictive power for branch A is higher than for
branch B (think in terms of R2). Consequently, as the R2 for branch A is higher, it would imply more standardized
loans. Therefore, for cross-sectional analysis, we scale the residuals for each branch by the standard deviation
of the dependent variable.
30 The results are also robust to the inclusion of city-quarter fixed effects and a linear branch-level time trend. The
results are reported in Internet Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
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Figure 8
Cross-sectional variation
The graph plots the kernel density functions of standardized residuals (estimated by Equation 5) for loans falling
within the approval limits of all branches. The graph is trimmed to show 98% of the sample.
intensify over time. Column 9 of Table 8 reports the same result more formally.
The estimated coefficient on the Before2 is economically small and statistically
insignificant, meaning that there is no pre-trend in the data.
All in all, our results suggest that loans become more standardized in more
hierarchical structures; this finding is consistent with some recent research on
contract standardization (Cornell and Welch 1996; Rajan et al. 2015). Taken
together, our results in Section 4, provide support to this notion that an increase
in organizational hierarchy adversely affects the allocation of bank credit. Banks
not only reduce the quantity of loans disbursed but also those loans default more
and are less profitable.
5. Other Results
5.1 Trade-off: Large loans
A rationale for upgrading a branch is to increase the maximum loan approval
limit, that is, the loan size that can be approved internally in a given branch.
After upgrading a branch, the organizational distance between the borrower and
the decision maker increases for small loans. But the opposite is true for the
loans that were above the approval limit of the branch and had to be approved
externally before the upgrade.31 If the information argument is true for small
loans, it is likely to also hold for the larger ones. Thus, large loans should benefit
from the upgrade, as the manager can now decide about the loans internally.
31 Formerly, a loan application had to be sent to a regional, zonal, or head office, where another manager would
evaluate the application based on the material submitted.
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Figure 9
Dynamics plot: Contract standardization
The horizontal axis shows the time, in quarters, since the branch reorganization (0 represents the first two quarters
of the reorganization). The vertical axis measures the contract standardization or “quasi” R-squared measured as
the standard deviation of the residual estimated using Equation (5). The coefficients are estimated using Equation
(3). The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
We find an improvement in the lending outcomes on large loans (see Table 9).
This finding provides additional support for our results on small loans. First, to
capture the effect on the total debt granted, we use ln(1+Debt) as the dependent
variable (Column 1). Second, the effect on the large loan extensive margin,
that is, the probability of a large loan being granted, is captured by a linear
probability model (Column 2). Third, as the average number of “large loans”
per branch-quarter is 1.4, computing the second moment of the residual, our
measure for contract standardization, becomes challenging. Therefore, we use
the mean absolute value of the residual estimated in specification 5 (Column
3). The properties of this measure are similar to the main proxies of contract
standardization “quasi” R-squared. The less standardized is a contract, the
greater the mean absolute value.32
The estimated coefficients on the Branch Level are positive and significant
across all three specifications. The estimates imply that lending of large loans
increases when the approval of these “large” loans is carried out internally
(Column 1), and the probability of issuing a large loan increases by 3.3
percentage points (Column 2). The latter result is equivalent to a 21% increase
in the average probability of issuing a large loan. Contracts are also less
standardized (Column 3). To address the reverse causality, we also show the
dynamic effects. None of the estimated effects have a pre-trend.
32 We test this proxy in our main results on small loans and find the same results as with other information measures
in qualitative terms.
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Table 9
Effect of organizational design on large loans, eligible for approval internally
ln
(
1+valueb,q
)
1#loansb,q>0 Residual ln
(
1+valueb,q
)
1#loansb,q>0 Residual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level 0.509*** 0.033*** 0.016***
(0.150) (0.011) (0.004)
Before−2 0.305 0.019 0.005
(0.205) (0.015) (0.005)
Before0 0.617*** 0.041*** 0.013**
(0.210) (0.015) (0.006)
After2 0.530** 0.034** 0.013**
(0.221) (0.016) (0.005)
After4+ 0.565*** 0.036** 0.019***
(0.202) (0.014) (0.005)
Observations 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079
Adj−R2 0.324 0.309 0.253 0.324 0.309 0.253
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
This table reports the effect of organizational design on loans that had to be approved externally (e.g., regional
office) before the change, but can be approved internally since the increase in the approval limit of the branch.
We report the estimated effect on log debt amount (Columns 1 and 4), the probability of receiving any credit
(Columns 2 and 5), and contract standardization (Columns 3 and 6) using specification (1). The measure of
contract standardization is the mean absolute value of the residual, estimated by Equation (5). The unit of
analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value
(level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical
branches, respectively. Before−2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded)
in one or two quarters. Before0 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded)
this quarter or one quarter ago. After2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded
(downgraded) two or three quarters ago. After4+ is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was
upgraded (downgraded) four quarters ago or more. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered
at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
Although small loans suffer from the hierarchy, the very large borrowers,
who, in terms of physical distance, are closer to the decision maker after a
branch is centralized, benefit from the proximity. Thus, while a branch might
be losing on the small loans, it could recover the loss through gains from the
large loans. Therefore, we examine how organizational hierarchy affects the
combined retail portfolio including both small and large loans.
We find that when a branch is upgraded, the gains on large loans are not
sufficient to cover the losses that a branch makes on the small loans. In
the combined retail portfolio, the default rates increase and returns decrease
(Columns 4 and 5 in Table 10), while the lending volume remains unchanged
(Column 6). We also find that the loan contracts are more standardized
(Columns 1 through 3). Thus, the overall effect on the retail portfolio remains
negative.
Although better performance on larger loans does not offset the inferior
performance on smaller loans, this is a trade-off worth highlighting. It is
important to note that we measure costs at the branch level. To understand the
overall effect of organizational hierarchy, one has to evaluate the performance
of the bank. Upgrading a branch frees up resources at regional, zonal, or
central offices, because large loans are approved internally afterward. As a
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Table 10
Combined retail portfolio
“Quasi” R2 ln
(
σloanb,q
)
ln
(
IQRb,q
)
VW default VW ROL ln(new ind.
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level −0.033*** −0.043* −0.092*** 0.013*** −0.004** −0.038
(0.008) (0.023) (0.027) (0.003) (0.002) (0.030)
Obs 54,079 54,079 54,067 54,079 54,079 54,079
Adj-R2 0.107 0.408 0.350 0.187 0.157 0.469
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
In this table, we report the effect of the organizational hierarchy for the combined retail portfolio (i.e., it includes
both small and large loans). We report the effect on the contract standardization (“quasi” R-squared), standard
deviation of debt, interquartile range of debt, value-weighted defaults and return on loans, and total new lending
to retail borrowers in Columns 1 through 6, respectively. The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The measure
of contract standardization is estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from the regression
model defined in Equation (5). The defaults are measured as whether a loan is over 60 days late 1-year forward.
The return on loans is measured as defined in Equation (2). The variable Branch Level is a number between 1
and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches
and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered
at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
result, regional- or higher- level offices are less overburdened with tasks from
local branches, making them more effective in other bank-level assignments.
For instance, these offices can focus on business development, marketing
campaigns, risk management, and other activities that affect the overall
performance of the bank. The data are consistent with this. During our sample,
the profitability of the bank increased, suggesting that the aggregate effect of
hierarchization was positive. Furthermore, the bank opened branches in 43
previously unbanked districts, thereby accessing new markets. With that in
mind, we refrain from making any claims on the overall profitability of the
bank, because we do not have a control group for the bank-level analysis.
5.2 Hierarchy and corruption
Full delegation in the presence of corruption is a double-edged sword (Tirole
1986; Banerjee et al. 2013). On the one hand, if the private benefits of an agent
are aligned with those of the principal, delegation may be a good idea, as it
creates an extra incentive to perform the task. For instance, Bandiera et al.
(2009) document that giving more discretion to bureaucrats in Italian public
procurement may lead to budget savings, even though it allows the bureaucrat
to pocket some of the money. On the other hand, if an agent’s private benefits
are not aligned with the profit-maximizing behavior of the principal, it may be
worthwhile maintaining control over the employees. Essentially, the nature of
corruption determines the optimal level of discretion.
To understand how organizational hierarchy interacts with rent-extraction,
we compare the effects in more corrupt states to those in the less corrupt ones.
We proxy for corruption with two measures. The first one focuses on branches
in the so-called “BIMARU states,” (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
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Uttar Pradesh) which have been singled out for corruption (see, e.g., Kumar,
2007).33 The second measure is the corruption index provided by Transparency
International. The index is particularly useful for our study, because it examines
corruption in banking services. It measures the fraction of respondents who
actually paid a bribe for obtaining these services. The study points out that the
majority of these bribes were paid to secure a loan. The size of such a bribe
ranges between 5% and 10% of the notional value.34 The corruption measure
is reported at the state level and ranges from 1.2% in West Bengal to 39.2% in
Bihar.
Both measures indicate that the negative effects of organizational hierarchy
are mitigated in more corrupt areas (see Table 11). These findings are in
line with the view that greater delegation reduces information frictions, while
simultaneously enabling rent extraction. However, if the decision-making were
centralized in the corrupt branches, the benefits of limiting corruption would
attenuate the loss of information. The point estimates suggest that the effect
of hierarchy disappears or becomes positive in very corrupt areas (corruption
index of 39.2%). This highlights the gains of having organizational hierarchy
in areas prone to more corruption.
5.3 Preexisting borrowers
We now turn to evaluating how organizational hierarchy affects borrowers
who have an existing credit record with the bank. This comparison is useful,
because the bank may have generated information about these borrowers
during the relationship. Thus, it is plausible that the negative effect of the
branch hierarchization is weaker. To examine this, we repeat our difference-in-
differences test on the sample of all repeat borrowers. We find that the results are
somewhat weaker (Table 12). Overall, the weaker effect on existing borrowers
is consistent with the view that some of the information generated in the due
course of a relationship. Thus, the loss of information due to organizational
hierarchy is not as large.
5.4 Upgrades versus downgrades
The difference-in-differences empirical strategy employed so far identifies the
effect of hierarchy on lending. It assumes that upgrades and downgrades are
symmetric. Here, we examine whether the treatment effect is symmetric.
On examining upgrades and downgrades separately, we find asymmetric
effects (Table 13).35 While the upgrade results in a lowering of both the
33 We find similar results using an alternative corruption proxy—BIMAROU—that includes the state of Orissa on
the BIMARU list.
34 The survey sample spans randomly selected households across the whole of India. For specific details about the
sample and methodology, please refer to the original report by Transparency International India (2008).
35 Because of the confidentiality agreement, we cannot report the number of observations when we split into
upgrades and downgrades. This information might reveal the identity of the bank.
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Table 11
Organizational hierarchy and corruption
“Quasi” R2 VW ROL VW default “Quasi” R2 VW ROL VW default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level −0.046*** −0.016*** 0.020*** −0.063*** −0.024*** 0.028***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
Branch level x BIMARU 0.043** 0.019*** −0.021***
(0.018) (0.005) (0.006)
Branch level x 0.190** 0.091*** -0.091***
% Experience corruption (0.080) (0.028) (0.034)
Obs 54,079 54,079 54,079 53,475 53,475 53,475
Adj-R2 0.110 0.137 0.183 0.110 0.136 0.184
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
The table reports the effect of organizational design depending on the severity of corruption in the area. We report
the estimated effect on the measure of contract standardization (Columns 1 and 4), value-weighted return on loans
(Columns 2 and 5) and default (Columns 3 and 6). The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch
level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize
the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. BIMARU is a dummy variable
equal to one if the branch is located in the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh,
which have been singled out for corruption and dysfunction (columns 1 through 3). % Experience Corruption,
provided by Transparency International, measures the fraction of people who had to pay a bribe to receive banking
services in any given state. Please note that the number of observations in Columns 4 through 6 is slightly lower
because the study by Transparency International does not report the results for three states: Chandigarh, Dadra
and Nagar, Haveli Daman and Diu. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch
level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
Table 12
Repeat borrowers
“Quasi” R2 VW ROL VW defaults ln(new ind.
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Branch level −0.027** −0.014** 0.006 0.031
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.049)
Observations 20,988 20,988 20,988 20,988
Adj-R2 0.087 0.115 0.140 0.315
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y
The table reports results on all repeat borrowers. We report the estimated effect on
the measure of contract standardization (“quasi” R-squared, Columns 1), value-
weighted return on loans (Column 2) and default (Column 3), and total new lending
to small individual borrowers (Column 4). The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter.
The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value
(level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches
and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. The standard errors are reported
in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
quantity and quality of credit, the reverse is not true for the downgrade.
A plausible explanation for these effects deals with the differential labor
adjustment following an upgrade vis-à-vis a downgrade. When a branch is
upgraded, it gains a senior-level manager along with some other lower-level
support staff to cope with the increased scale of business. This relaxes the
resource constraints facing the branch prior to the upgrade and generates
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Table 13
Upgrades versus downgrades
“Quasi” R2 ln(IQRb,q ) ln
(
σloanb,q
)
VW ROL VW defaults ln(new ind.
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Upgrades
Branch level −0.047*** −0.133*** −0.119*** −0.011*** 0.015*** −0.113***
(0.009) (0.031) (0.025) (0.002) (0.003) (0.036)
Adj-R2 0.110 0.269 0.291 0.136 0.182 0.395
B. Downgrades
Branch level 0.018 −0.078 −0.003 −0.005 0.008 −0.039
(0.018) (0.055) (0.047) (0.005) (0.007) (0.054)
Adj-R2 0.109 0.264 0.291 0.137 0.186 0.406
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
The table reports the results using a sample of all branch upgrades (panel A) and downgrades (panel B). The
control group are all branches that did not change their organizational design. We report the estimated effect
on the three measures of contract standardization (Columns 1 to 3), value-weighted return on loans (Column 4)
and default (Column 5), and total new lending to small individual borrowers (Column 6). The unit of analysis
is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1)
and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches,
respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
immediate results. In the case of the downgrade, however, it takes time to
reallocate the existing staff to other branches, as labor laws make it difficult to
lay off an employee. Furthermore, there is a view that banks are overstaffed,
so there is no obvious place they can be relocated. Also, moving them around
is costly, as the bank has to pay relocation costs, which are quite substantial.36
Thus, when the branch is upgraded, it obtains the resources relatively quickly.
This adjustment, however, is slower in the case of a downgrade, because the
bank needs to find an appropriate place where they can justify the relocation in
terms of costs. Consistent with this, when the downgrade and upgrade happen
in the same district, this adjustment is fast and we find that downgrades generate
symmetric effects. The results are reported in Table 14.
5.5 Nonlinear effects
Next, we examine whether reorganization from 1 to 2 generates similar effects
compared to a reorganization from 2 to 3. Our main specification treats these
as equal. Here, we augment our main specification by adding an interaction of
branch level and a dummy variable of whether the reorganization was between
levels 1 and 2 or 2 and 3. We find some convexities in the costs that are associated
with organizational hierarchy. The effects are stronger for changes from 2 to
3 as opposed from 1 to 2 (see Table 15). This finding is consistent with the
36 By rough estimates, they are between 4 and 6 months of an officer’s salary. Moreover, relocation is very disruptive
for the family of the officer. The bank thus makes every effort to ensure that the officers are not moved around
too much and spend at least 3–5 years in a given location.
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Table 14
Downgrades with a nearby upgrade
“Quasi” R2 ln(IQRb,q ) ln
(
σloanb,q
)
VW ROL VW defaults ln(new ind.
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level 0.034 −0.257*** −0.145* −0.013* 0.019* −0.144*
(0.023) (0.099) (0.077) (0.007) (0.011) (0.085)
Adj−R2 0.110 0.262 0.290 0.138 0.186 0.405
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
The table reports the results using a sample of branch downgrades that are accompanied with an upgrade of
another branch in the same district within a year. The control group consists of all branches that did not change
their organizational design. We report the estimated effect on the three measures of contract standardization
(Columns 1 to 3), value-weighted return on loans (Column 4) and default (Column 5), and total new lending
to small individual borrowers (Column 6). The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch level
is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the
least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. The standard errors are reported
in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant
at 1%.
Table 15
Nonlinear effects of hierarchy
“Quasi” R2 ln(IQRb,q ) ln
(
σloanb,q
)
VW ROL VW defaults ln(new ind.
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Branch level −0.020** −0.125*** −0.075*** −0.008*** 0.012*** −0.059*
(0.009) (0.030) (0.025) (0.002) (0.003) (0.034)
Branch level x −0.052*** 0.007 −0.083* −0.009** 0.008 −0.160**
Change 2-3
(0.018) (0.058) (0.044) (0.004) (0.005) (0.071)
Observations 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079
Adj-R2 0.110 0.270 0.291 0.136 0.183 0.396
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
The table reports the additional effect of changing hierarchy from 2 to 3 (or 3 to 2). The dummy variable Change
2-3 equals 1 if the organizational change is from 2 to 3 or 3 to 2 and zero otherwise. We report the estimated effect
on the three measures of contract standardization (Columns 1 to 3), value-weighted return on loans (Column 4)
and default (Column 5), and total new lending to small individual borrowers (Column 6). The unit of analysis
is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1)
and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches,
respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
Williamsonian view on the dis-economies of scale in organizations (Williamson
1967; Williamson 1988).
6. Robustness
We have so far shown that a change in organizational design affects a bank’s
ability to produce information on loans and has implications for capital
allocation decisions by banks. This section addresses a few more items that
could potentially confound our inference.
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Table 16
Manager rotation
“Quasi” R2 VW ROL VW defaults ln
(
loanb,q
)
ln(new ind. ln
(
σloanb,q
)
ln
(
IQRb,q
)
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Change −0.012 −0.002 −0.001 0.014 −0.012 0.029 0.038
(0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023) (0.041) (0.031) (0.038)
Obs 33,684 33,684 33,684 33,684 33,684 33,684 33,684
Adj-R2 0.135 0.131 0.188 0.454 0.395 0.328 0.297
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
The table reports the results of manager rotation when the organizational design remains unchanged. We show
the estimated effects on the contract standardization (“quasi” R-squared, Column 1), the value weighted return
on loans (Column 2) and defaults (Column 3), log average loan (Column 4), log total new individual lending
(Column 5), standard deviation of debt (Column 6), and the interquartile range of debt (Column 7). The unit
of analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Change is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager changed
at the branch b, in quarter q, and zero otherwise. The measure of contract standardization is estimated as the
standard deviation of the residuals obtained from the regression model defined in Equation (5). The defaults are
measured as whether a loan is over 60 days late 1-year forward. The standard errors are reported in parentheses
and clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
6.1 New officer effect
A change in organizational design also brings in a new official as the head
of the branch. If the branch is upgraded to a higher level, it brings in a more
experienced and senior official to head the branch. One would expect that the
presence of an experienced official should improve the credit allocation decision
in the bank because the loan officer, approving loans earlier, now has access to
a more knowledgeable advisor. It should be noted that such an effect, if present,
would lead to increased information and lower defaults on loans, thus biasing
against finding the result that we have identified in the paper.
In a similar vein, one could argue that the arrival of a new branch manager
leads to a temporary loss of information and thus generates both poor
performance of loans and higher standardization (a new officer tends to overrely
on hard information). This story may seem plausible, but it is not supported by
our data. First, such an effect should also be present, and perhaps to a higher
degree, when officers are rotated without the change in organizational design.
We exploit an internal rotation policy of branch managers and do not find this
to be the case (see Table 16).37 Second, we do not find the effect to be transient;
that is, the effects do not reverse once the officer is comfortable in the new
system.
6.2 Manipulation
As noted above, the reorganization of a branch entails a change in the loan
approval limit. This change in the cutoff point may alter the composition of
borrowers around the threshold. This can be demonstrated by the following
37 Please refer to Fisman et al. (2017) for more details about the rotation policy.
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situation. An individual with no credit history or adverse credit history requests
a loan of 550,000 rupees from a manager whose approval limit is only 500,000
rupees. Even though, after a thorough investigation, the manager knows that
the borrower is of the good type, the very nature of the information makes
it extremely difficult to transmit it to the regional office. Hence, forwarding
the application further would clearly lead to a rejection. Anticipating this, the
manager may instead offer the client a loan of 500,000 rupees that falls within
his approval limit. If such terms are acceptable to both parties, a loan is granted.
However, in the period after upgradation, the branch manager who is heading
this branch does not face this dilemma (if the approval limit is above 550,000
rupees) as he can approve this loan within the branch. He would then simply
approve the 550,000 rupee loan. Thus, manipulation of the loan amount may
change the composition of borrowers around the threshold.
Additional tests show that this does not affect our results. We begin by plotting
the Epanechnikov kernel density functions around the normalized cutoff for pre-
and post-treatment periods. As can be seen in Figure 10, both distributions are
statistically the same around the cutoff point and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
for the equality of the distributions cannot be rejected at the 1% level. In other
words, we find no evidence of any bunching around the threshold.38 Next, we
disregard loans that are within a 20% window around the cutoff39 and reestimate
our specification. Our results remain virtually the same with the lower approval
limit (Table 17). Finally, as already noted, the smallest common cutoff is binding
only for a subset of bank branches (roughly one-sixth of branches). Excluding
those branches leaves our results qualitatively unchanged. In sum, all three tests
allay all concerns of manipulation around the cutoff.
6.3 Borrower switching
We have extended our analysis to account for the possibility that borrowers
could be switching (1) across branches within the bank or (2) to branches of
other banks. To account for switching, we evaluate geographic areas with few
outside options, that is, areas with no other bank branch of this or any other
bank in close proximity. We obtain data from the bank on branch offices that are
the sole banking services provider within an 8- to 10-kilometer radius (panel
A of Table 18). For robustness, we examine branches that are the sole bank
branch within a banking area, as defined by the Reserve Bank of India (panel
B of Table 18).40 Using both measures, we find similar effects in these isolated
areas.41 Thus, it is unlikely that our results are driven by borrower switching.
38 The humps in the distribution represent the round numbers of popular loan amounts, such as 450,000 and 550,000.
39 For example, if the cutoff is 500,000 rupees, then all loans from 400,000 to 500,000 would not be considered.
40 We thank the Reserve Bank of India and, particularly, Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala for providing us with the data.
41 The results become somewhat statistically weaker as a result of the sample size.
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Figure 10
Distribution around the approval threshold
The graph plots kernel density functions of loans around the threshold value for pre- and post-treatment periods.
The threshold is normalized to equal 1. We show the frequency of all loans that fall within the 40% window
around the threshold value. The values to the right of 1.00 are above the threshold, and the values to the left are
below it.
The effects are very similar to the main specification, except for the result on
total lending.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
A large literature in financial intermediation delegates the role of screening and
monitoring to banks. In accordance with these theories, delegation is efficient,
because it reduces duplication in monitoring costs and free-riding problems
that are associated with multiple creditors. But for a bank to deliver on these
tasks, it must have the correct organizational design in place.
Several theories postulate a link between organizational hierarchy and
lending, but empirical work has lagged behind. In this paper, we use a quasi-
natural experiment research design to investigate this question and find that an
increase in hierarchy adversely affects lending. We find that hierarchization of a
branch increases the delinquency rate by 30% and decreases the return on loans
by 14%. Furthermore, it leads to standardization of loan contracts. Overall, our
findings suggest that a hierarchical organizational structure distorts production
and communication of information.
A few points are worth highlighting. First, our study documents trade-offs
associated with the organizational hierarchy at a branch level, but it is silent
on overall bank profitability. It is very likely that the bank overall benefits
from the organizational restructuring, as the bank’s profits have increased
during our sample. Upgrading a branch, for example, frees up resources at
regional- and higher-level offices. These offices can direct their efforts toward
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Table 17
Loan size manipulation around the approval limit
VW defaults VW ROL “Quasi” R2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Branch level 0.013*** −0.008*** −0.035***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Before−2 0.006
(0.011)
Before0 −0.009
(0.012)
After2 −0.022*
(0.013)
After4+ −0.047***
(0.010)
Observations 54,079 54,079 54,079 54,079
Adj-R2 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.11
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y
In this table, we report the effect of the organizational hierarchy for the loans well below
the loan approval limit of the head of the branch. We redefine the approval limit as 80%
of the true threshold. We report the effect on the value-weighted defaults (Column 1)
and return on loans (Column 2), and the contract standardization (“quasi” R-squared,
Columns 3 and 4). The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The measure of contract
standardization is estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from the
regression model defined in Equation (5). The defaults are measured as whether a loan
is over 60 days late 1-year forward. The return on loans is measured like in Equation (2).
The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1)
and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most
hierarchical branches, respectively. Before−2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1)
if the branch was upgraded (downgraded) in one or two quarters. Before0 is a dummy
variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded this quarter or one quarter ago.
After2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch was upgraded (downgraded)
two or three quarters ago. After4+ is a dummy variable that equals 1 (−1) if the branch
was upgraded (downgraded) four quarters ago or more. The standard errors are reported
in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; and *** significant at 1%.
business development and other bank-level assignments. For instance, this bank
expanded its reach and opened up new branches in several previously unbanked
areas (in total 43 previously unbanked districts during our sample). Because we
lack a control group, we refrain from making any causal claims about overall
bank profitability. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the negative effects
of organizational hierarchy are mitigated in more corrupt areas.
Second, this paper identifies the effect of hierarchy on information
production, but it does so in a setting in which incentive contracts are fixed
across different branches. This is ideal from an identification point of view, but
it leaves the following questions unanswered: can one overcome the problem
of hierarchies with well-designed incentive contracts, or are there limits to
delegation in these branches? These are important questions for future research.
Third, our paper also shows that large organizations mitigate the problem of
transmitting information by creating within-firm suborganizations. Although
the bank is very hierarchical with many layers of managers, it creates branch
offices and commits to credibly delegate decision-making power to those
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Table 18
Lead bank
“Quasi” R2 ln(IQRb,q ) ln
(
σloanb,q
)
VW ROL VW defaults ln(new ind.
debtb,q
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Single branch within 8–10 km
Branch level −0.030** −0.136*** −0.058* −0.008*** 0.011*** 0.003
(0.015) (0.044) (0.035) (0.003) (0.004) (0.047)
Observations 24,111 24,111 24,111 24,111 24,111 24,111
Adj-R2 0.110 0.199 0.232 0.122 0.150 0.412
B. Reserve Bank of India measure
Branch level −0.018 −0.173*** −0.091** −0.008 0.013** −0.065
(0.018) (0.048) (0.045) (0.005) (0.006) (0.058)
Observations 24,923 24,923 24,923 24,923 24,923 24,923
Adj−R2 0.122 0.200 0.250 0.137 0.190 0.407
Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Branch FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
The table reports results for branches that are the only branch in an area: (1) 8- to 10-kilometer radius as provided
by the Bank (panel A), (2) banking area, as defined by the Reserve Bank of India (panel B). We report the
estimated effect on the three measures of contract standardization (Columns 1 to 3), value-weighted return on
loans (Column 4) and default (Column 5), and total new lending to small individual borrowers (Column 6).
The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the
lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most
hierarchical branches, respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch
level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
offices. In line with Stein’s (2002) view that more hierarchical firms tend to
base their decisions on hard information, this result shows that banks are able
to mitigate this challenge internally.
Fourth and finally, our results may have important implications for economic
inequality. The current trend toward more globalized and hierarchical banks
raise natural concerns that low-income (also ‘soft’ information) borrowers may
be left behind. If so, such a shift may aggravate inequality in society. This may
not be an issue in a frictionless world, where new intermediaries would enter
to fill this gap. But recent events give us reason to be suspicious of this benign
“Coasian” view of the world. In reality, markets may be slow to adapt, and
low-income borrowers may be thrown into a vicious poverty trap. It is useful to
recall the recent case of former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman, Ben Bernanke,
who failed to refinance his house, because loan pricing models overestimated
his credit risk after his job switch to Princeton University.42 This example
underscores the dangers of increased reliance on hard information. Ultimately,
how the organization of finance affects inequality is an important and interesting
question for future research.
42 Loan pricing models typically interpret job switching as a negative credit event (Irwin 2014).
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